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INEXPENSIVE OR JUST SPEEDY
AND INEXPENSIVE?
MANDATORY ALTERNATIVE




"More judicial bang for the judicial buck."2 That's what Congress is seeking
with its enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.3 Title 1V of the Act
may be a harbinger of the largest change in federal practice since the promulgation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over fifty years ago.5 The Act authorizes
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the federal district courts in addition to
providing other reforms.6 One district court, designated as one of three ADR
"demonstration districts" by the Act, seized upon this mandate and launched an
1. "[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
2. S. REP. No. 101-416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6802, 6805 (quoting Hearings on S. 2648 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1990) (statement of Senator Thurmond)).
3. S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, at 6805; Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (Title I to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82).
4. Title I of the Act is also known as the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. S. REP. No. 101-416,
supra note 2, at 6803.
5. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, at 6804 (describing reforms as "comprehensive").
6. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5092. Title I of the Act sets forth a six-
point plan for the courts to follow. Id. at 5091. The plan includes ADR and is outlined more fully
below. See infra note 9. Title II of the Act increases the size of the federal judiciary by 77 circuit and
district court judges. Id. § 202, 104 Stat. at 5098.
1
Fredlund: Fredlund: Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive or Just Speedy and Inexpensive
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ADR program that is inclusive of almost all filings in that district and provides
mandatory ADR for a significant number of cases filed in the district.
7
Congress enacted Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 to address
the problems of cost and delay in civil litigation.' Title I of the Act sets forth a
six point plan designed to help achieve these goals.9 This Comment focuses on
one of the six points of the plan, "expanding and enhancing the use of alternative
dispute resolution,"1" and on the Western District of Missouri's ADR program
designed in response to the Act.11 The importance of the Western District's
program is that it may have an effect on ADR programs in other federal district
courts throughout the country because the Judicial Conference of the United States
may develop a model plan for all district courts based on the Western District of
Missouri's program. 2 The workability and legal viability of the Western
District's program will be watched closely as the federal courts look to chart a
course between overcrowded courthouses and infringement on constitutional and
legal policy traditions.
This Comment will address five questions which may arise as challenges to
the Western District of Missouri's implementation of its ADR program. First, is
the experimental program designed by the court likely to be predictive? That is,
will the program be able to tell us whether cost and delay are being reduced by
the ADR program? Second, is the program as implemented likely to reduce cost
and delay? Third, does the Western District of Missouri have authority to impose
mandatory ADR on litigants? Fourth, is the provision for mandatory ADR
constitutionally sound? And fifth, assuming affirmative answers to these
questions, does the General Order of the Western District of Missouri promote
policy concerns?
7. See generally General Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Early Assessment Program (October 31, 1991) [hereinafter EAP Order] (on file in the
University of Missouri School of Law library and also available on request to the Western District of
Missouri). The two other demonstration districts are the Northern District of California and the
Northern District of West Virginia. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 104, 104 Stat. at 5097.
8. S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, at 6803.
9. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 102, 104 Stat. at 5089. The six components of the plan
are:
(1) building reform from the "bottom up"; (2) promulgating a national, statutory policy
in support of judicial case management; (3) imposing greater controls on the discovery
process; (4) establishing differentiated case management systems; (5) improving motions
practice and reducing undue delays associated with decisions on motions; and (6)
expanding and enhancing the use of alternative dispute resolution.
S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, at 6817.
10. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5092.
11. EAP Order, supra note 7 (setting forth the Western District of Missouri Program).
12. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5094 (judicial conference will
prepare manual for litigation and cost and delay reduction to be developed after the demonstration
programs are evaluated).
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
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A brief overview of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
necessary because it authorizes judges to hold settlement conferences 3 and, some
believe, to impose on the parties ADR procedures such as arbitration, mediation,
early neutral evaluation, magistrate settlement, mini-trials and summary jury
trials.14 A discussion of the 1988 Arbitration Act"5 which represents Congress'
first foray into ADR programs in the Article III courts follows the overview of
Rule 16.16 An analysis of both Title I of the 1990 Act and the General Order of
the Western District of Missouri which establishes an ADR experiment in that
court completes the necessary background.
II. FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as originally adopted in
1937, made no express reference to settlement of cases.17  The omission of
reference to settlement reflected a view that settlement was not at the heart of the
pretrial conference, but that instead the focus of the conference should be on
narrowing issues for trial and expediting proof. 8 The practical result of this
omission 9 was to vest trial judges with broad discretion to deal with the topic
of settlement during pretrial.20
Rule 16 was first amended in 1983. During the period prior to the Rule's
1983 amendment, many judges began defining their roles more in terms of case
management and less in terms of neutral adjudication.2' Judges began to look
to ADR in the interest of settling cases before trial as dockets became more
13. FED. R. Cv. P. 16(c)(7). "The participants at any conference under this rule may consider
and take action with respect to the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute." Id.
14. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. 603, 605 (D. Minn. 1988).
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988).
16. Congress has enacted legislation concerning ADR which affects the state courts, the
administrative courts and administrative rule making processes. See Dispute Resolution Promotion Act
of 1979, 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-10 (Supp. IV 1981); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No.
101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990); Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat.
4969 (1990).
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 28 U.S.C. (1982) (as originally adopted in 1937).
18. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rule Making, 137 U. PA.
L. REv. 1969, 1980-81 n.40 (1989).
19. The omission, in the words of one member of the advisory committee, was "no mere chance."
Clark, To An Understanding Use of Pretrial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 455 (1962). It reflected Advisory
Committee concerns about suggestive or coercive use of settlement by the trial judge. Clark,
Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 169 (1956).
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crowded.22 Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to reflect this shift in focus on the
judicial role.23
The 1983 amendment recognized the trend toward judicial case management
by encouraging settlement. Indeed, the Advisory Committee notes suggest that
this was an important purpose behind the decision to amend the rule.' The
changed title of the rule, from "Pre-Trial Procedure-Formulating Issues" to "Pre-
Trial Conferences: Scheduling; Management," itself indicates the scope of the
changes.'
Under the 1983 amendment, one of the subjects which may be considered at
the pretrial conference is "the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial
procedures to resolve the dispute."2' The rule thus codified the managerial trend
without revoking the trial judge's broad discretion to determine which approach
should be taken concerning settlement discussions in the pre-trial conference.
2 7
The 1988 Arbitration Act provided additional guidance to the district courts
concerning Congress' view of the necessity for the increased use of ADR
methods.' The 1990 Judicial Improvements Act likewise encourages the use of
ADR,29 practically expanding the role which ADR formerly held under Rule 16.
B. The 1988 Arbitration Act
In 1988, Congress enacted legislation establishing a court-annexed arbitration
experiment in the federal district courts.30 The experiment, as set forth in the
1988 Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act), is designed so that it will expire on
November 19, 1993.31 Congress drafted the Arbitration Act so that it will not
affect out-of-court arbitration recognized by the United States Arbitration Act.32
Under Title II of the Arbitration Act certain federal district courts may refer
qualified civil actions, including adversary proceedings in bankruptcy, to
arbitration.33 Title II authorizes twenty district courts to participate in this
22. Id. at 1984. The delay in civil litigation probably results in part from the enactment of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974 which required the setting of an expeditious trial date in criminal cases. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-74 (1985).
23. FED. R. Cv. P. 16. The rule was amended again in 1987 for gender neutrality. Id.
24. Id. advisory committee's note.
25. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1985 n.62.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
27. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1985.
28. Congress' first attempt to provide a mechanism for ADR was targeted at the state, not federal
courts. See Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-10. The Act expired in
1983. Id.
29. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5092-93.
30. 1988 Arbitration Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58.
31. Arbitration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 906, 102 Stat. 4659, 4664 (1988).
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 651 practice commentary (1988); see United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-15 (1992 Supp.).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 651. Local rules are required to enact this procedure. Practice commentary,
supra note 32.
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experimental program. 34 For purposes of the experiment, the twenty districts are
divided into two groups of ten courts each. as
At the inception of the Arbitration Act ten district courts had already
implemented arbitration by local rule.36 These ten courts may, in their discretion,
refer any civil action to arbitration if the parties consent3 to arbitration.
3 8
Additionally, these ten courts may compel arbitration of pending civil actions if
the relief sought consists solely of monetary damages in an amount under
$100,000.39
The compulsory referral is subject to the requirement that a case arise neither
under the Constitution of the United States nor under a statutory civil rights
claim. 40 Each court maintains discretion to exempt a case from arbitration on a
party's or its own motion where "the case involves complex or novel legal issues,"
"legal issues predominate over factual issues," or where there exists "other good
cause."
41
In the second group of district courts, there is no compulsory arbitration
provision. Submission of a case to arbitration may only be done with the consent
of the parties. 42 The Senate would not allow compulsory arbitration in any of
those district courts which had not already established compulsory arbitration by
local rule.43
District courts authorized to participate in either phase of the experiment
establish their own standards for certification of arbitrators.44 Arbitrators have
the powers to "conduct arbitration hearings," "administer oaths and affirmations"
and "make awards., 45 However, arbitrators are not authorized by the Arbitration
Act to hold parties in contempt.46
34. Arbitration Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 568. The Act contains a sunset provision allowing the
experiment a five year run. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 906, 102 Stat. at 4664.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 658(1)-(2).
36. Id. § 658(1). These courts are the Northern District of California, Middle District of Florida,
Western District of Michigan, Western District of Missouri, District of New Jersey, Eastern District
of New York, Middle District of North Carolina, Western District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and the Western District of Texas. Id.
37. Id. § 652(d)(1)-(2) (defining consent).
38. Id. § 652(a)(1)(A).
39. Id. § 652(a)(1XB). The courts which had established a lower amount-in-controversy maximum
were not required to raise the maximum to $100,000. Id. The attorney for the party seeking damages
in excess of the $100,000 limit must certify that the damages requested exceed that amount. Id. §
652(a)(2).
40. Id. § 652(b)(1)-(2).
41. Id. § 652(c)(1)-(3).
42. See id. § 652(a)(1)(B).
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 652 practice commentary (1988).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 656(a).
45. Id. § 653(a)(1)-(3).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 653 practice commentary (1988).
1992]
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A party dissatisfied with an arbitration award is entitled to a trial de novo
upon request.47 The judge who presides over the trial will not have knowledge
of the result of the arbitration." After the arbitrator enters the award, and after
the time lapses for a request for a trial de novo, the arbitration award has the same
force and effect as a judgment of a court in a civil action except that it is not
subject to review.49
The response of the legal community to court-annexed arbitration is mostly
positive."0 However, to date, few hard statistics are available from which to
measure the relative success of ADR programs."1
III. THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI PROGRAM
A. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 began as Senate Bill S. 2027, the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, on January 25, 1990, when the bill was
introduced by Senator Biden, Chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and
Senators Thurmond, Metzenbaum, Heflin, Kohl, Simon, and Specter. 2 Chairs
Brooks and Fish of the House Judiciary Committee and Chair Kastenmeier and
Representative Moorhead of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property and Administration of Justice introduced the House of Representatives'
companion bill, H.R. 3898.s3
On March 6, 1990, the Senate held a hearing on S. 2027."4 The proposed
legislation received strong criticism from members of the judiciary and was
thereafter revised to its present form.55 In its present form, the legislation has
the wide approval of the federal bench. 6
Many of the ideas engendered in Title I of the Act were derived from the
report of a Brooking Institute Task Force convened at Chairman Biden's
request.5 7 Title I of the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act requires all federal
district courts (exempting the bankruptcy courts) to establish a "civil justice
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 655.
50. See, e.g., Broderick, Court Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217,
223 (1989).
51. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 15
(1985).
52. S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, at 6805.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 6808.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 6816.
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
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expense and delay reduction plan."58  The stated purposes of the plans to be
implemented by the courts are: "to facilitate adjudication of civil cases on the
merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management and to ensure just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes." 9
Each federal district court, working with its advisory group, is required to
consider all parts, and authorized to implement any or all parts of a six-point
plan.' The Act requires that the advisory groups be "balanced and include
attorneys and other persons who are representative of major categories of litigants"
in the court.6' The Act also requires that the United States District Attorneys for
the districts be permanent members of the advisory groups. 62 Other members of
the groups may serve terms of no longer than four years.' The Act makes no
express provision for the role of judges in the advisory groups. However, the
Federal Judicial Center has recommended that judicial officers serve in the groups
as non-voting members.64
Title I of the Act focuses on the pretrial stage of proceedings and is designed
to work within the discretion allowed by amended Rule 16. It proposes means by
which to put a handle on cost and delay, including referral of certain types of
cases to ADR programs that "have been designated for use in a district court; or'
that the court may make available."'6
While the Act requires all courts to consider implementing ADR, it also
mandates that three courts conduct a mandatory experiment using ADR.6 These
three courts are: the Northern District of California, the Northern District of West
Virginia, and the Western District of Missouri.67
The 1990 Judicial Improvements Act and its legislative history suggest
several ADR devices that may be used by the district courts in their ADR
programs: the summary jury trial, early neutral evaluation, mini-trial, mediation,
58. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5090. Title I does not specifically
exclude bankruptcy courts from the program. However, the legislative history implies that the Act is
not intended to apply to cases pending in these courts. See generally S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note
2.
59. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5092.
60. Id. at 5091. The chief judge of each district court is required to appoint an advisory group
to develop recommendations for the development and implementation of the civil expense and delay
reduction plan. Id. at 5094. The advisory group for each court will be composed of attorneys, persons
"representative of major categories of litigants" in the court and other persons as determined by the
chief judge of the court. Id.
61. Id. at 5094.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT 5 (1991).
65. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5092.
66. Id. at 5092-93.
67. Id. at 5096.
1992]
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the multi-door courthouse approach, and so-called "settlement weeks."' 6 The list
is not intended to be exhaustive.69
At least as interesting as what Title I of the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act
says is what it does not say. Like the Arbitration Act, Title I of the 1990 Judicial
Improvements Act does not provide for the imposition of sanctions. Additionally,
the 1990 Act does not say who shall preside over the authorized ADR
proceedings. While the 1990 Act's legislative history identifies some specific
ADR methods which may be employed, neither the 1990 Act nor its legislative
history shed light on whether the procedures may be made mandatory. There is
also no provision for the assessment of fees.
B. The Western District of Missouri's Early Assessment Program
Recently, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri
approved an experimental program called the "Early Assessment Program" [the
Program], which is to begin on January 1, 1992 and end on December 31,
1994.70 The Program does not replace the Joint Trial Calendar, a limited master
calendar under which all available judges agree to accept cases which are ready
for trial.71 The new Program is substantially different from the Calendar in that
it focuses on the early pre-trial, rather than the trial phase of the proceedings.
7 2
The Program provides mandatory court-annexed ADR for roughly one-third
of all civil cases filed in the Western District of Missouri and encourages
voluntary court-annexed ADR for another third of filed cases. 73 Referral to the
Program will be based on random assignment.74 All cases in the following
categories are explicitly exempt from the program: 1) multi-district cases, 2)
social security appeals, 3) bankruptcy appeals, 4) habeas corpus actions, 5)
prisoner pro se cases, 6) other pro se cases in which a motion for appointment of
counsel is pending, and 7) class actions.75
68. Id. at 5097; S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, 6830-33; see infra Appendix A (listing
programs described in the Order of the Western District of Missouri).
69. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. at 5092.
70. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 1.
71. Interview with Kent Snapp, Plan Administrator for the EAP, phone conversation (March,
1992).
72. See generally EAP Order, supra note 7.
73. Id. at 1-2.
74. Id. at 1. The assignment of cases into the three groups is made by computer. Interview with
Kenneth D. Dean, Assistant Dean of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Reporter for
the EAP, Columbia, Missouri (March, 1992). The computer program anticipates the number of cases
to be filed in a month, and then assigns cases randomly to each of the three groups in equal numbers
based on projected monthly filings. Id. It is possible, though unlikely, that a party could increase its
chances of being in one group by having information about the number of cases anticipated to be filed
and those assignments that have already been given out. Id. This method would require luck as well
as information and will not pose much of a practical threat to the random nature of the assignment.
Id.
75. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 1-2.
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The Program is designed to allow statistical comparison between cases which
are referred through a court-annexed ADR process and cases which are not
referred through the process. 6 A control group of 33.3% of non-exempt cases
will not be referred to the Program in either its mandatory or voluntary application
and will therefore be exempted from any participation in court-annexed ADR
processes."' However, parties designated to be in the control group may request
inclusion in the Program and are not forbidden to pursue other, non-court-annexed,
ADR programs on their own initiatives.78
Parties who request to "opt in" the Program, as well as those who request to
"opt out" will have their requests reviewed by the Plan Administrator (the
Administrator) who is authorized to reassign such a party for "good cause." 79
The Order establishing the Program cautions that the diversion of a significant
number of cases may render statistical comparison difficult.80
A case assigned through the Program to participate in ADR is scheduled for
an Early Assessment Meeting (EAM) within 30 days after response to
pleadings."1 At the EAM the Administrator will advise the parties of ADR
options, such as arbitration and mediation."2 If additional discovery is warranted,
or if the parties choose to pursue early neutral evaluation, the Administrator will
design a plan by which to proceed. 3 The Administrator may turn the EAM into
a mediation session, in which the Administrator will act as mediator if such action
is "appropriate" and "agreeable to the parties."84
If the parties cannot agree on an ADR option at the EAM, the Administrator
may schedule a second meeting within 90 days.85 At either the EAM or the
second meeting, the parties must select an ADR option by which to proceed."
If the parties cannot agree on an ADR option, an ADR option will be chosen for
them by the Administrator.87
Attendance of the parties is required at the EAM." Parties other than
natural persons must be represented by a person with "reasonable settlement
authority, and with sufficient stature in the organization to have direct access to
those who make the ultimate decision about settlement." 9 Additionally, counsel
76. Id.; see Appendix A (describing the District's description of available ADR processes)..
77. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.




85. Id. at 3. This is true unless the Administrator determines that a later date is necessary. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. (the representative may not be outside or local counsel).
1992]
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primarily responsible for the case are required to attend the EAM.9° The Order
establishing the program provides that the court may impose "appropriate
sanctions" for failure to participate in the program "in accordance ... with the
spirit of [the] Order." 91
Within 120 days after completion of the responsive pleadings, the parties or
the Administrator will decide which ADR option to pursue. 92 The Program does
not give any additional time guidelines. A backlog of cases may develop as the
court adjusts its resources to meet the needs of court-annexed ADR. The Program
does not make clear whether the court will set a trial date for ADR cases before
or after the ADR process is complete. 93
The court en banc will select the Administrator who may be either an
employee of the court or a general contractor.94 The Administrator maintains
authority over the Program and has the responsibility to report regularly to the
Advisory Group on the status of the Program. 95 Specifically, the Administrator
will: (1) administer the program and coordinate activities with the clerk of the
court, (2) coordinate the selection of cases for the Assessment, (3) conduct the
Assessment, (4) assist in monitoring evaluation of the program, (5) preside over
the "opt in" and "opt out" processes, (6) recommend to the court modifications of
the program, and (7) collect files from neutrals. 96 The Order establishing the
Program provides no express qualifications for the Administrator, no term of
office, and no definition of tenure. 97  The Order also does not indicate what
salary or compensation the Administrator will receive.
As is the norm with ADR proceedings, most communications between the
parties which take place during the course of the Program are confidential.98
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs introduction of
evidence from settlement talks, will apply to these proceedings in the Western
District of Missouri.99  There are several exceptions to confidentiality of
information exchanged during the course of the Program: (1) information which
90. Id.
91. Id. at 14.
92. See id. at 2-3 (this time frame consists of 30 days for assessment and 90 days for selection
of form of alternative dispute resolution).
93. The Program will probably not affect trial scheduling as a practical matter. Interview with
Kenneth D. Dean, supra note 74.
94. See EAP Order, supra note 7, at 4. The current Administrator is an employee of the court.
Interview with Kent Snapp, supra note 71.
95. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 4.
96. Id.
97. The current Plan Administrator was hired for a three-year term, a term which coincides with
the duration of the Act. Interview with Kent Snapp, supra note 71.
98. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 5.
99. Id. There is some question whether ADR proceedings in the Western District of Missouri will
be deemed by other federal courts to be "settlement discussions" within the meaning of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 408 and whether such proceedings will be deemed confidential under state law.
Interview with Kenneth D. Dean, supra note 74. The issue of confidentiality of ADR procedures in
other courts has not yet been litigated.
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
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is independently discoverable is not immune from discovery by virtue of its
disclosure during the proceedings; (2) the Administrator may disclose the non-
compliance of a party to the judge assigned the case or to the court en banc; (3)
special provisions apply to a request for trial de novo following arbitration; and
finally, (4) the Administrator may use information regarding the case in his
evaluation reports.'0°
Each ADR option requires a neutral party to preside over the
proceedings. 1 ' The Order establishing the Program sets up guidelines for the
qualifications and compensation of neutral parties.'0 2  The court will not
compensate the neutral parties, instead, the cost of the neutral party will be borne
equally by the litigants unless the litigants agree to a different allocation of the
cost. 0 3 If litigants can demonstrate to the Administrator an inability to pay, they
may request the services of a neutral party who has agreed to serve pro bono'0 4
Otherwise, the neutral party's fees will be set by the neutral party himself.' 5
Local attorneys will act as neutral parties in the Program."° The court provides
a questionnaire to local attorneys which requests information concerning areas of
expertise and required fees. 7
IV. COMMENT
A. Will the Experiment Yield the Results it is Designed to Achieve?
Is the Program designed so as to produce results which can, with an
acceptable measure of certainty, tell us whether or not it is reducing cost and
delay? Without a well designed experiment which contains acceptable controls,
the results of the experiment cannot tell us whether ADR is working.
The Western District's Program is important to the future of ADR because
the results of the experiment are likely to be predictive. Currently there are few
sophisticated data concerning the time and cost of ADR relative to traditional
litigation processes) °0
In areas such as ADR "where data are fragmentary and the available
analytical tools are crude, there is considerable potential for both inconsistent
100. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 4-5.
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 12-13. A person may be a neutral if he or she is a former state judge who presided
over a court of general jurisdiction or is a retired federal judicial officer or is a member of the Missouri
bar who has been a member of a state bar for eight years or longer, and completes required training
courses and is approved by the court or its designee. Id.
103. Id. at 13-14; see id. at 16-17 (attachment B, Neutral's Application Form).
104. Id. at 13-14.
105. See id. at 16-17 (attachment B, Neutral's Application Form).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Sander, supra note 51, at 15.
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results and disagreements interpretation."'" Many experiments are conducted
on an ad hoc basis, others, such as the 1988 Arbitration Act do not provide an
adequate control group."1 Thus, the "incredible" 99% settlement rates reported
by some courts may not be as incredible as they seem.' It is well known, for
example, that a "full-blown" trial is an unusual event; that trial occurs in
"appreciably less than ten percent of cases."1 1 2 Whether "success rates" truly
reflect a significant increase in the number of cases being settled before trial will
require a true experiment, with appropriate numbers of cases available for
comparison and adequate controls.
1 3
The ideal experiment would randomly assign cases through the ADR program
to allow statistical comparison with similar cases which are not referred through
ADR." 4 The Missouri program satisfies this criteria by providing for a random
assignment of approximately 33.3% of civil cases through the program.'" The
random assignment does not hinge on case filing numbers or on a system which
the litigants would be able to anticipate, and perhaps avoid."6
Exempting certain types of cases from ADR will not affect the verifiability
of results of the experiment. However, the experiment will not be predictive of
ADR results for those types of cases which are exempted. The "opt in" and "opt
out" provisions in the Western District program are more problematic. These
provisions will affect the randomness of the study." 7 We can assume that a
party applying to opt-in or opt-out is motivated to do so because the party has
decided that either inclusion or exclusion would be to its benefit.11 8  As the
109. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice: Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55,
55-56 (1988). For a discussion of statistical studies of procedural devices see Zeisel & Callahan, Split
Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1963).
110. Statistics on results of the 1988 Arbitration Act appear to be significant to show that ADR
is working in those courts which have implemented the program. See., e.g., Kaufman, Reform for a
System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 20
n.133 (1990) (in the Northern District of California 99% of eligible cases terminated short of trial).
111. See Sander, supra note 51, at 15.
112. Id. at 31. "It is no secret that the overwhelming majority of legal disputes are settled without
trial.' J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TAcTICS, AND ETHIcs 88 (1983). Judge S. Arthur
Spiegel of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio estimates that over 95%
of civil cases are resolved before trial. Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829, 832
(1986).
113. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Dispute Resolution: Some
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Ct-. L. REv. 366, 367 (1986).
114. Id. at 374. (concerning random assignment of cases: '[alnd by random, I mean random; I
mean by use of a table of random numbers.").
115. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 1-2.
116. See supra note 74.
117. See Posner, supra note 113, at 375. On the topic of whether opt-in or opt-out presents a
practical problem, see infra note 119.
118. Posner, supra note 113, at 375.
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Order establishing the Program notes, the granting of options for a significant
number of litigants will damage the predictive nature of the study." 9
The Program is designed to be functional as well as predictive, however, and
if the Administrator feels that a case would benefit through the exercise of the opt
provision, it would be counter-productive not to allow a party to opt. Opt cases
should be factored separately from the regularly routed cases in order to retain the
predictive nature of the experiment. If substantial numbers of one type of case are
regularly allowed to opt-in or opt-out, the court should amend the Order
establishing the Program to provide for the regular inclusion or exemption of that
type of case.' 20
The Western District of Missouri Program allows parties to chose between
different ADR options such as mediation and arbitration.' 2' The choice is
intended to benefit the litigants by allowing them to choose the option which they
feel will help them reach the best resolution of their cases. 122  The choice
presents a problem for the predictive nature of the experiment because it reduces
the number of cases that can be used for strict comparison. The Administrator can
keep separate records of the success rate of the ADR options but the number of
cases which the Administrator can then use to compile statistics on each
alternative might be so small as to make meaningful comparison impossible. 23
If comparison is impossible, determining which ADR option, for example
mediation or arbitration, is working best to achieve settlement is likewise
impossible. Of course, the Administrator will be able to keep records of the
overall success rate of the program.
A similar record-keeping problem arises in determining whether ADR works
for different types of cases. For example, if one-third of contracts cases
participate in mandatory ADR, and one-fifth of that one-third choose arbitration
over other ADR options, our numbers for comparison have become very small
indeed. This problem is intensified with case types having low filings in the
district.12
4
119. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 3. However, to deny parties the opportunity to opt-in or opt-out
raises its own problems. To exclude cases from a program which is designed to benefit litigants seems
patently unfair to those excluded who therefore cannot benefit from court-annexed ADR.
120. In fact the Order does provide for modification of the Program by the Administrator. EAP
Order, supra note 7, at 4.
121. Id. at 18-21 (attachment C, Notice to parties when case has been selected for EAP so that
parties can commence preparation).
122. Id.
123. The number of cases assigned to the mandatory ADR track in the first quarter of 1992 was
56. Letter from Davis Loupe to April Fredlund (April 1, 1992) (these are the tentative first quarter
statistics). Nine EAM's have been held, two follow up meetings, and one magistrate settlement
conference. Id. (these are also tentative statistics).
124. For example, it would be difficult for the Administrator to amass meaningful statistics on the
success rate of arbitration in antitrust cases if in 1992 only five antitrust cases are filed in the district,
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B. Will the Program be Effective in Reducing Cost and Delay?
Some commentators believe that filings may actually increase as more cases
are settled without trial.'2 The number of cases filed may increase as more
cases are settled and fewer reach publication. 6 This reduces the information
available to prospective litigants about the probable resolution of their cases.
127
Because of the dearth of adverse precedents, some litigants will file who would
not have filed if published adverse precedents existed."=
Additionally, some commentators believe that litigation delay serves to keep
down the number of cases filed by reducing the present value of potential
judgments and therefore reducing plaintiffs' incentives to bring low-dollar
cases.1 29 Arguably, if delay is reduced, more litigants may be encouraged to file
as the present value of their cases increases. However, increased filings will not
frustrate the purpose of ADR. Instead, increased filings may show that the federal
court system is becoming more accessible. 30
If the Western District of Missouri Program is to work in substantial
measure, it should be targeted at those types of cases which represent the heaviest
burden on the court. An analysis of the cases filed in the Western District of
Missouri may give some indication of whether the Program is targeted at those
types of cases which are filed often and those types of cases which take the
greatest amount of judge-time to be resolved.
The Western District of Missouri has six judgeships."' In 1990, 2395
cases were filed in the district, showing a decrease from the previous year's filings
of 2846 cases, but reflecting an increase in filings as a general trend over the last
nine years.1
32
Of the 2395 cases filed in the Western District of Missouri in 1990, the top
five types of civil cases by number filed were: prisoner cases at 968, contracts
cases at 280, civil rights cases at 237, "all other" cases 133 at 216, and personal
125. Posner, supra note 113, at 388.
126. Id.; Kaufman, supra note 110, at 30.
127. Posner, supra note 113, at 388.
128. Id.
129. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. REv. 527,534 (1989);
see Posner, supra note 113, at 388.
130. Cf Posner, supra note 113, at 388-89.
131. The 1990 Judicial Improvements Act did not increase the number of judgeships in the
Western District of Missouri.
132. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER & THE ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDANCE
TO ADVISING GROUPS APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT OF 1990: PREPARED FOR
THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICr OF MIssoURI 8 & 12 (1991).
133. "All other" cases includes all cases besides those involving: asbestos, bankruptcy matters,
banks and banking, civil rights, commerce (ICC rates, etc.), contract, copyright, patent, trademark,
ERISA, forfeiture and penalty (excluding drug forfeitures), fraud, truth in lending, labor, land
condemnation and foreclosure, personal injury, prisoner, RICO, securities and commodities, social
security, student and veteran loans, and tax. See id. at 12.
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
14
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/8
MANDATORY ADR
injury cases at 178.134 The top five types of civil cases by "weight"'35 were:
civil rights, prisoner, contracts, "other," and personal injury.1 36 In 1990, civil
trials accounted for a little less than 70% of total trials, or about 140 trials.
37
The "life expectancy" of the average civil case filed in the Western District of
Missouri in 1990 was about 14 months.1 3
8
If the Program of the Western District of Missouri works to reduce delay we
may expect to see a reduction in the percentage of civil cases brought to trial, over
the course of a few years.139 Additionally, we can expect to see a corresponding
decrease in the life expectancy of new cases. As noted above, an increase in
filings will not be a signal that the Program is not reducing cost and delay for
individual cases. However, the practical result of an increase in filings may result
in delay in the system in general.
The Western District of Missouri's Program includes almost all types of cases
in its ADR system. Although prisoner cases account for the greatest percentage
of the court's caseload, these cases come to the court primarily under its appellate
jurisdiction and are therefore inappropriate to the application of ADR. Overall,
the Program is targeted to reach the greatest number of cases practicable.
C. Does the Western District of Missouri Have Authority to Implement
the Program?
The authority of a district court to implement non-mandatory ADR remains
largely unquestioned. In Link v. Wabash Railroad,4 the Supreme Court
recognized "the control necessarily vested in [district] courts to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."'
4
'
Most cases resolved through the use of ADR are resolved through voluntary
ADR and therefore are not the subjects of litigation.142 Whether the control
vested in courts to manage their cases is sufficient to allow for the use of
mandatory ADR has been the focus of litigation challenging the legality of such
mandatory provisions. A majority of district courts considering the question of the
134. Id.
135. Weight is a measurement which is reflective of work time by the courts. Id. at 13. This
ordering is based on an analysis of cases filed from 1988-1990. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 14.
138. Id. at 15. "Life expectancy is a familiar way of answering the question 'how long is a
newborn likely to live.'" Id. at 14.
139. Cf id. at 14. '[D]ata for a single year or two may not.., provide a reliable predictor of the
time that will be required for new cases to move from filing to termination." Id.
140. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
141. Id. at 630-31; see also Brockton Say. Bank v. Pete, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5,
11 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986) (concerning the idea that district courts exercise
procedural authority outside the explicit language of the rules of civil procedure).
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courts' authority to conduct mandatory ADR processes have found that the courts
do have authority to implement such procedures.143
Defenders of mandatory ADR find authorization for its use in Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in the nebulous doctrine of inherent judicial
power.'" However, in Strandell v. Jackson County,"' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that a district court may not
"impose settlement on unwilling litigants" although the courts may encourage
settlement talks.1" District courts in at least three circuits have expressly
rejected Strandell.'47
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 does not indicate whether mandatory
ADR procedures may be used by the district courts which will participate in the
"demonstration district" program. The legislative history of the Act, however,
suggests that Congress intended to vest the district courts with authority to
implement mandatory programs.1" The Act does specifically authorize the
courts to require attendance of the parties at each pretrial conference and to
require representatives with authority to bind the parties to be present at settlement
discussions, at least by phone.1
49
The Act does not expressly authorize the imposition of sanctions or the
assessment of fees, but the Order of the Western District of Missouri provides for
both. 5 While Congress remains silent on the issue, several circuit courts have
held that sanctions may be imposed for failure to cooperate in pretrial
proceedings. 5  Overall, it appears that the Western District of Missouri
Program will survive an authorization challenge.
D. Is the Program Constitutionally Sound?
The seventh amendment provides the basis for most constitutional challenges
to ADR programs. 15 2  The question presented under seventh amendment
jurisprudence is whether the use of compulsory ADR in the pre-trial process
143. See, e.g., Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 606; McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48-
49 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (emphasizing that local rule authorizing ADR makes the court's authority
particularly clear); Arabian Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
144. See Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 606; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48-49;Arabian Oil Co., 119
F.R.D. at 449.
145. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
146. id. at 887.
147. See Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 606; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48-49; Arabian Oil Co., 119
F.R.D. at 449.
148. See S. REP. No. 101-416, supra note 2, at 6832 (noting that "[c]lients are required to attend"
summary jury trials and that "[in some state jurisdictions, parties are required to attempt mediation
before they can proceed to trial").
149. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 130, 104 Stat. at 5092-93.
150. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 11 & 14.
151. See, e.g., Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990); G. Heilman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 1989).
152. Kaufman, supra note 110, at 27.
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violates the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. 153  However, all ADR
programs, while diverting cases through ADR, do provide the litigants with a right
to jury trial at some stage in the proceedings."t 4 More narrowly framed, the
seventh amendment question is: at what stage in a case must a jury trial be
granted if requested by the parties? The seventh amendment does not indicate at
which stage of a case a jury trial must be held when demanded. 55 It is clear,
at least, that the amendment does not require that a jury trial be held in the earliest
stages of a case.
156
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof57 is the leading case on the permissibility of
diversion through alternate systems. In Capital Traction, the Supreme Court
considered whether the requirement that a party try a case before a justice of the
peace impermissibly interfered with the seventh amendment right to a jury
trial.58 The Supreme Court held that Congress had "considerable discretion" to
require a preliminary step "within reasonable bounds" so long as the right to trial
by jury was not "unreasonably obstructed." 59
Generally, courts find that pretrial compulsory ADR processes do not
unreasonably obstruct the right to a jury trial.' 60 For example, in Rhea v.
Massey-Fergusen,'6' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that local-rule
compulsory mediation did not violate the seventh amendment right to jury trial
where the local rule provided the parties with resort to a trial de novo. 162 The
court held that the seventh amendment right to jury trial "was designed to preserve
the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the
great mass of procedural forms and details."'163 The court based its decision in
part on previous federal cases upholding mandatory arbitration procedures."6
The Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 affords no insight into whether
mandatory ADR in the federal courts will fail the Capital Traction test. Unlike
the 1988 Arbitration Act, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 does not
establish an across-the-board prohibition on fees or set a time limit for the
153. The seventh amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
154. Kaufman, supra note 110, at 27.
155. Id. at 26.
156. Id.
157. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
158. Id. at 22. The parties retained the right to a trial de novo in front of a jury and the process
also required the party seeking review to post an appeals bond. Id. at 23.
159. Id. at 44-45.
160. Cf Strandell, 838 F.2d at 886-88.
161. 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 269.
163. Id. at 268 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)).
164. Id.; see Davison v. Sinai Hosp., 462 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Md. 1978), aft'd, 617 F.2d 361
(4th Cir. 1980). Note that Davison, unlike Rhea, involved a state statute that declined jurisdiction for
certain cases if they were not first arbitrated. Id. at 779.
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institution of pre-trial ADR 65  Future litigants in the Western District of
Missouri will have to rely on a violation of the Capital Traction "reasonableness"
requirement in challenging the constitutionality of ADR on seventh amendment
grounds.' 66 Thus far, no federal program has failed the test.1 67  In practice,
for a program to fail, it must either provide a significant financial barrier to the
parties or a delay in adjudication long enough to be viewed by a court as
unreasonable."6 Of course, as programs expand in scope, delay in the programs
may increase and with the increased delay, programs may fail the Capital Traction
test.169
The Western District of Missouri Program will probably survive a Capital
Traction challenge. The Program requires that pretrial ADR procedures be
conducted within 120 days of case filing.' The additional expense of the
Program to the litigants is limited to increased attorneys' fees17' for the ADR
procedure and the neutral's fee. 17 2 In light of the court's purpose to reduce cost
and delay, these additional burdens on the parties will probably be deemed
reasonable by a reviewing court.
The right of access to the federal courts is an issue which is related to, but
distinct from, seventh amendment jurisprudence. Professor Lawrence Tribe
believes that there is a fundamental right of access to the courts which is based
in the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment and the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 73 If access to the courts is a fundamental right,
it will trigger strict scrutiny.174 However, the Supreme Court has been willing
to find that access to the courts is a fundamental right only when the underlying
action itself involves a fundamental right. 75
165. See 28 U.S.C. § 653(b).
166. Capital Traction, 174 U.S. at 45.
167. At least one state court program has stated that an ADR program violated the right to jury
trial in practice. See Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 396, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (1980) (in practice
compulsory arbitration forced great delays-over four years-thus making the state right to jury trial
practically unavailable).
168. See id. at 396, 421 A.2d at 195.
169. Coulson, The Coming Evolution in CourtAdministeredArbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 276,276-
77 (1986).
170. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 2-3.
171. See generally id.
172. Id. at 13-14.
173. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1462-63 (2d ed. 1988).
174. Id. A fundamental right is a right which is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1972). Under strict
scrutiny, the government has the burden of showing that a challenged program is narrowly tailored to
meet its objectives. Id. at 16-17.
175. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fundamental right to marry). If a right
is not deemed fundamental a program need only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose to
be upheld. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 17; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per
curium); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449-50 (1973).
[Vol. 1992, No. 1
18
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss1/8
MANDATORYADR
The Western District of Missouri Program will almost assuredly pass a
rational basis test if reviewing court looks at whether the requirement of ADR is
rationally related to reducing cost and delay in civil litigation. 7 6  If the
underlying cause of action presents a fundamental right, it is less clear whether a
court will find that the Program is sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to meet the
objective of reduced cost and delay. However, if a court takes into account the
need for experimentation with ADR in the federal courts, as well as the objective
of the experiment, the Program would probably pass a strict scrutiny test.
A fifth amendment/fourteenth amendment due process/equal protection attack
on the constitutionality of ADR focuses on the inequality in access to the courts
between those districts which have ADR and those which do not. A majority of
courts considering this issue have held that mandatory ADR does not violate the
due process clause. In Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn,' the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the court's compulsory arbitration program did not violate
due process. 7 In Kimbrough, plaintiffs claimed that the arbitration provision
violated equal protection in three ways: first, litigants in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania were treated differently from litigants in other courts; second,
plaintiffs and defendants were treated differently on request for a trial de novo;
and third, parties with claims which totalled over $50,000 were treated differently
from parties with claims which totalled under $50,000 (the program only provided
for mandatory arbitration of claims totalling under $50,000).' 79 Because the
court analyzed the case under seventh amendment jurisprudence, the court used
a rational basis test in examining the classifications.8
The court upheld the mandatory arbitration provision finding that the
compulsory requirement of arbitration was rationally related to the governmental
goal of conserving judicial resources and was not an undue burden on the
parties.'
8 1
However, equal protection and due process challenges have yet to be resolved
and remain a possible and viable challenge to the Western District of Missouri's
program. The variable treatment oflitigants within the district seems to provide
an equal protection challenge to some litigants. The courts will likely weight
176. In applying the traditional rational basis test the Supreme Court has usually upheld
classifications based upon "a state of facts that can be construed to constitute a distinction or difference
in state policy." Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
177. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
178. Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 574.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 577. The use of court-annexed arbitration has also passed constitutional challenges in
the state courts. See, e.g., Firelock Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989) (mandatory arbitration
provision did not violate equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Grace v.
Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 491, 283 N.E. 474, 481 (1972) (striking down a statute requiring arbitration
for some automobile accident cases); Grayley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ohio Ct. App.
1976) (finding that a distinction between medical malpractice tort claimants, who were required to
pursue ADR, and other tort claimants, who were not, violated the fourteenth amendment).
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heavily the importance of the experiment for gathering data and will allow the
Program to proceed as designed.
E. Will the Program Further Public Policy Objectives?
The policy objectives behind promoting ADR as a pre-trial settlement tool
find solace in the assumption that ADR is useful in reducing cost and delay. This
section examines whether the results of ADR will be "just" in a broad sense of
that word.
Removing a significant number of cases from publication presents two issues
which should be considered in determining whether ADR is meeting policy
concerns. The first is whether ADR runs afoul of the first amendment when it
excludes the press from its proceedings. The right of the press to access ADR
proceedings is best argued in regard to cases which are assigned to arbitration,
summary jury trial or mini-trial.182 These processes are most like a trial, which
the press has traditionally been able to access, and least like settlement
conferences, which the press has traditionally not been able to access.
83
Cincinnati Gas and Electric v. General Electric Co."8 is the leading case
concerning public access to ADR proceedings. In Cincinnati Gas and Electric,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether first amendment rights
mandate press access to summary jury trials.' 85 The court relied on the two
prong test found in Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court"8 6 to hold that no
such first amendment right exists.18 7 The Cincinnati Gas court first considered
whether the proceeding was one for which there has been a "tradition of
accessibility.""' Next, the court considered whether public access to the
proceedings played a "significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question.
' 189
Using the two part test, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there
was no tradition of access in summary jury trial proceedings because: (1) the
"tradition" is a process less than a decade old;' 90 (2) the court found that access
to the press played no significant positive role in the functioning of ADR; (3)
ADR serves a substantial government interest in relieving the case burden of the
182. Kaufman, supra note 110, at 36.
183. Id.
184. 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nom., Cincinnati Post v. General Elec. Co.,
489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
185. Id. at 900.
186. 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
187. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903.
188. Id.; see Press Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982)).
189. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903; see Press Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8 (citing Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606).
190. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 903.
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federal courts; and (4) allowing access to the press would frustrate the utility of
ADR as a settlement device. 91
Notwithstanding the question of whether a first amendment right attaches to
access of the press to settlement proceedings, a second question remains: should
the results of court mandated settlement or pretrial procedures be available to the
public as a practical matter? If the Western District of Missouri Program is
successful in removing many cases from litigation and resulting in more
settlements, it does run the risk of appearing unduly inaccessible to the public.
Unlike the 1988 Arbitration Act, the Order of the Western District of Missouri
does not exempt constitutional or statutory civil rights claims from ADR
processes.'92 As a result, these disputes will be removed from public scrutiny,
should they settle before trial. 93
Part of the impetus of civil rights plaintiffs for bringing suit is to expose to
society unfair or discriminatory practices. 94 While ADR vindicates the personal
right asserted, it keeps the case from the public eye and thus frustrates one of the
plaintiff's purposes behind bringing the case. 95 For example, if a plaintiff
receives a satisfactory ruling in arbitration or in a summary jury trial, or in any
other ADR forum in which a decision, not just guidance, is given by a neutral,
there will be less incentive for that plaintiff to pursue a trial de novo. To do so
would be to run the risk of an adverse ruling. Therefore the winning result for the
plaintiff may be less than a total victory.
Meanwhile, the losing defendant is unlikely to pursue a trial de novo, for
even if he were to win at trial, he would run the risk of notoriety, at least until the
case came to resolution. Through ADR, the defendant thus avoids the gaze of the
public eye. This could be more of a financial benefit to him than actually winning
a civil rights claim in court.'96
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of ADR in civil rights cases is the
limitations placed on the neutral party who fashions the remedy. In civil rights
cases, broad injunctive relief may be sought. The neutral party in an ADR
proceeding will most likely be reticent or unable to order such relief. Even if the
neutral could offer such relief, he will likely feel more bound by precedent in
applying that relief than would a court.
The use of "hidden arbitrators" deciding private judgments concerning
minority needs runs the risk of disservice, both to the society as a whole-which
has a compelling interest in knowing of the treatment of its dispossessed-and to
the individual litigant who should be entitled to consideration of her case in a
191. Id. at 904.
192. See EAP Order, supra note 7, at 1.
193. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 360 (1990). Of course this will only become an issue in cases that would not
have settled before trial but for participating in mandatory ADR.
194. See id. at 360.
195. Again, this assumes a "but for" relationship regarding settlement and ADR.
196. Yamamoto, supra note 193, at 360-61.
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forum which is accountable, both to itself and its precedents, and capable of
applying legal principals to reflect legal and social concerns.197
While ADR may be conducive to a speedy resolution of civil rights and
constitutional law disputes, it has not yet shown that it can procedurally produce
a just result. The focus on satisfying the needs of an individual at the expense of
vindicating rights within the view of society serves to reinforce, and possibly
accentuate, existing power imbalances. 9 ' As the defendant's cost of litigation
decreases, including negative publicity as a cost to the defendant, the civil rights
defendant is put in a better position with respect to the civil rights plaintiff.,99
Moreover, if claims of civil rights violations impose a lower economic cost to the
defendant, there is a danger that he and others like him will not conform as readily
to the standard of behavior society has previously found to be proper.
Of course, the fairness argument applies to the ADR process in general.
Some commentators argue that settlement negotiations leads to more just results
which are available to the parties earlier and at less cost.200 Others contend that
settlement can exacerbate existing inequities.
21
The argument in favor of ADR suggests that a reduction in delay may accrue
to the benefit of the weaker party. The weaker party may be coerced into
settlement by delay.202  To the extent that ADR eliminates delay-coerced
settlements, it serves to eliminate inequality.2 3  Judicially sanctioned
intervention in the settlement process may serve to eliminate coercion in another
way as well: where settlement is conducted in the presence of a neutral party, it
is less likely that the stronger party will prevail through sheer coercion.' ° 4
Additionally, if we can assume that ADR provides the parties with better
information concerning a decision to settle, it benefits both parties. To test the
validity of this assumption we need to compare ADR awards to awards given in
the same case at trial to see if the results converge. Some data indicate that
convergence of results is not a common occurrence. 20 5 Of course, we can only
measure convergence in those cases in which a party requests a trial de novo.
These are likely to be the "hard cases" in which different judges might reach
different results. In these cases, perhaps a recommendation of a neutral will not
really aid the parties in determining the settlement value of a case. The 1988
197. Id.
198. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil
Procedure in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 131 (1988).
199. See Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1391-1404.
200. See, e.g., Flanders, Case Management in the Federal Courts: Some Controversies and Some
Results, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 147, 150 (1978).
201. See, e.g., Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
202. Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Services and the Need
for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1822-24 (1986).
203. Kaufman, supra note 110, at 29 n.193.
204. Id. at 29.
205. Id. at n.192.
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Arbitration Act avoids this problem by exempting from arbitration those cases in
which questions of law predominate.2" The Western District of Missouri
Program does not make distinctions between cases which primarily concern issues
of law and cases which primarily concern questions of fact. Therefore, the
Western District of Missouri Program may be of little predictive value to parties
who present claims centered primarily on issues of law and may serve to
exacerbate existing inequities between litigants.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal district courts have found license to practice mandatory ADR.
Mandatory ADR provisions have time and again passed constitutional and
authorization muster. It is time to find out if such provisions pass a practical test.
It is time to find out whether ADR works or not. The only way to determine the
viability of ADR in the federal system is to experiment. The federal district courts
are the only laboratories which can conduct such an experiment.
The Western District of Missouri Program is well designed for workability.
It is also as well-designed an experiment as can be expected in a system which
must balance important rights against the need to see if ADR works. Whether the
Western District's Program will indeed reduce cost and delay for litigants is
impossible to say at this point. In fact, it will probably be several years before we
will be able to say whether the Program has made any inroads into reducing cost
and delay. However, whatever the Program tells us about the ability of ADR to
reduce cost and delay, so long as the results of the Program tell us something, the
experiment will have accomplished its purpose.
The Western District of Missouri Program steers a narrow course between
the Scylla of increasing caseloads and the Charybdis of constitutional rights and
substantive social policies. A better course would exempt civil rights and
constitutional law cases from participation in the experiment, even though the
experiment might not reduce as much court congestion, and even though to do so
may aggravate concerns that those cases routed through ADR are receiving
"second class justice." I propose this compromise because we do not yet know
if ADR will reduce cost and delay and produce just results-that is what the
experiment is designed to find out. In the meantime, the court should recognize
a compelling interest on the part of litigants to air their civil rights and
constitutional law claims, and a compelling interest on the part of the entire
society to know of the resolution of these disputes. The court should not run the
risk of sacrificing justice on the altar of efficiency.
APRIL A. FREDLUND
206. 28 U.S.C. § 652(c)(2).
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APPENDIX 20 7
Mediation
Mediation is a process in which a neutral third party assists the parties in
developing and exploring their underlying interests (in addition to their legal
positions), promotes the development of options and assists the parties toward
settling the case through negotiations.
The mediator is a lawyer, certified by the Court in accordance with this
order, who possesses the unique skills required to facilitate the mediation process
including the ability to help the parties develop alternatives, analyze issues,
question perceptions, use logic, conduct private caucuses, stimulate negotiations
between opposing sides and keep order.
The mediation does not normally contemplate presentations by witnesses.
The mediator does not review or rule upon questions of fact or law, or render any
final decision in the case.
Non-Binding Arbitration
Non-binding Arbitration is a procedure in which the parties choose a neutral
person to hear their dispute and render a decision. An arbitration is typically less
formal than a trial, is usually shorter, and is conducted in a neutral setting. An
arbitrator may be selected by the parties on the basis of his or her expertise, or on
the basis of the mutual respect of the parties for the arbitrator. The decision can
become final and a judgment of the Court after 30 days unless a party does not
agree to the decision. In that event, the case proceeds as scheduled to trial.
Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE)
Early neutral evaluation is a process in which parties obtain from an
experienced neutral (an Evaluator) a non-binding, reasoned evaluation of their case
on its merits. After essential information and position statements are exchanged,
the Evaluator convenes a session which typically lasts about two hours. At the
meeting, each side briefly presents the factual and legal basis of its position. The
Evaluator may ask questions and help the parties identify the parties' underlying
interests, the main issues in dispute as well as areas of agreement. He or she may
also help the parties explore options for settlement. If settlement does not occur,
the Evaluator then offers his or her opinion as to the settlement value of the case,
including the likelihood of liability and the likely range of damages. With the
benefit of this assessment, the parties are again encouraged to discuss settlement,
with or without the Evaluator's assistance. They may also explore ways of
207. EAP Order, supra note 7, at 19-21 (Attachment C (notice to parties to be given when case
has been selected for participation in early neutral evaluation)).
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narrowing the issues, exchanging information about the case or otherwise
preparing efficiently for trial.
The Evaluator has no power to impose a settlement or to dictate any
agreement regarding the pretrial management of the case.
Magistrate Settlement Conference
The purpose of the settlement conference is to permit an informal discussion
between the lawyers, parties and the magistrate of every aspect of the lawsuit, thus
permitting the magistrate privately to express his or her views concerning the
actual dollar settlement value or other reasonable disposition of this [sic] case.
The settlement conference statement (oral) of each party shall be presented
to the magistrate, setting forth the positions of the parties concerning factual
issues, issues of law, damage or relief requested. Pertinent evidence to be offered
at trial, documents or otherwise, should be brought to the settlement conference
for presentation to the magistrate if thought particularly relevant.
The magistrate may with the agreement of the parties converse with any or
all sides of the dispute outside the hearing of the other.
The failure to attend a settlement conference or the refusal to cooperate fully
may result in the imposition of sanctions by the magistrate. The magistrate may
issue such other and additional requirements of the parties or persons having an
interest in the outcome as he or she shall deem proper in order to expedite the
amicable resolution of the case. The magistrate shall not discuss the merits of the
case with the assigned Judge but may discuss the status of motions and other
procedural matters with him or her.
Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
The Administrator and the parties may decide that some other form of
alternative dispute resolution might be useful. Such other forms could include
mini-trials, summary jury trials, binding arbitration or some other form of ADR
developed by the parties in consultation with the Administrator.
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